ICDPASO Commercial Arbitration Rules Interpretation Series26“Hearing Method”

The provisions on the “Hearing Method” occupy a pivotal position in the governance of arbitral procedure. On the one hand, they determine the procedural form through which facts are ascertained and law is applied—whether by on-site hearing, remote hearing, or hearing by written submissions. On the other hand, they translate party autonomy and the arbitral tribunal’s procedural discretion into executable and monitorable case-management arrangements through procedural orders, procedural timetables, and case management conferences. Article 26 of the International Commercial Dispute Prevention and Settlement Organization (ICDPASO) Commercial Arbitration Rules (the “Rules”) (the “Article 26”) achieves, through a five-paragraph structure, a closed-loop design spanning “hearing modalities” to “procedural organization”: it establishes hearings as the default, with hearing by written submissions as an elective pathway; expressly authorizes the tribunal to conduct proceedings using communications technology; ensures procedural progression through procedural orders and a majority-vote decision mechanism; strengthens case management through timetables and case management conferences; and calibrates discretion by the baseline requirements of equal opportunity to present one’s case and a duty of procedural efficiency. This interpretation analyzes each paragraph in turn, and benchmarks it against the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (the “Model Law”) and the rules of UNCITRAL, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC), and the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC). It also integrates the online arbitration and hearing systems under the newly revised Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China (the "New Arbitration Law"), revealing the regulatory function and practical advantages of this provision.

I.Text of Article 26 of the Rules

Article 26. Hearing Methods

1. The Arbitral Tribunal shall hold a hearing, by means of on-site hearing and remote

hearing, to hear the case. 

The Arbitral Tribunal may, after consulting the parties, conduct the arbitral proceedings by video conference, teleconference or other communications methods it deems appropriate or the combination thereof. 

2. If the parties have agreed on a hearing by written submissions, such agreement shall prevail; however, if the Arbitral Tribunal deems it necessary, it may hold a hearing in person.

If the Arbitral Tribunal deems it unnecessary to hold a hearing in person, it may, with the consent of the parties, conduct a hearing by written submissions based on the evidence and documents submitted by the parties. 

3. Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the Arbitral Tribunal may hear the case in such manner as it deems appropriate, make a decision on the procedural arrangements of the arbitration, and issue a procedural order.

If the members of the Arbitral Tribunal disagree on procedural matters, the arbitral proceedings shall proceed in accordance with the majority opinion of the Arbitral Tribunal; if the members of the Arbitral Tribunal fail to reach a majority opinion, the arbitral proceedings shall proceed in accordance with the opinion of the presiding arbitrator. 

4.The Arbitral Tribunal may, as it deems necessary, work with the parties to prepare a timetable for the efficient conduct of the arbitral proceedings as the case may be.

In order to ensure the effective management of the case, the Arbitral Tribunal may, after consulting the parties, take further procedural measures or modify the procedural timetable by calling a case management meeting.

5. The Arbitral Tribunal shall treat the parties equally and give each party a reasonable opportunity to make statements and defend itself during the arbitral proceedings. 

The Arbitral Tribunal shall, upon exercise of its discretion, avoid unnecessary delay and costs and try its best to conduct the arbitral proceedings in an effective manner.

II. Paragraph-by-Paragraph Commentary on Article 26

Commentary on Paragraph (1): A Modern Expression of the Hearing-First Principle — A Parallel Architecture for On-Site Hearings, Remote Hearings, and Technology-Enabled Procedure

This paragraph establishes a hearing as the default procedural model, places on-site and remote hearings on an equal footing, and expressly permits the use of communications technology—either singly or in combination—to conduct the proceedings. Its core function is to provide an express, rule-based response to the international trend toward digitalization and procedural flexibility, thereby offering a clear and predictable framework for the Hearing Method.

1. Key features: a clear hearing-first principle with flexible modes of presentation

The paragraph first provides that the tribunal “shall hold a hearing,” confirming that, absent specific circumstances, a hearing—rather than purely hearing by written submissions—remains the default expectation. On that basis, it enumerates “on-site hearing” and “remote hearing” as two parallel modalities, both written into the text of the Rules. This goes beyond treating remote hearings as merely a substitute or temporary expedient. The paragraph further empowers the tribunal, after consulting the parties, to decide to conduct the proceedings via videoconference, teleconference, or other communications means it deems appropriate. The phrase “alone or in combination” grants the tribunal maximal flexibility to adopt hybrid arrangements tailored to the case—for example, some participants appearing physically while others join remotely, or the combined use of videoconferencing and real-time document-sharing platforms.

2. Comparative perspective

The drafting reflects both absorption and refinement of contemporary international practice.

Alignment with the ICC Rules: The ICC Rules (2021) likewise emphasize that, after consulting the parties, the tribunal may decide that hearings be conducted in person or remotely. Both frameworks stress the tribunal’s procedural leadership while requiring consultation of the parties.①

Consistency with the LCIA’s approach: The LCIA Rules (2020) similarly recognize that meetings and hearings may be conducted using technology and accept electronic communications as generally applicable.②

3. Practical value: efficiency, cost reduction, and enhanced procedural control

In an era of increasingly common cross-border arbitration, this rules-based arrangement offers several advantages:

Reducing procedural disputes: By confirming the legality and equal status of remote hearings, the paragraph reduces unnecessary contention over whether remote modalities are permissible, enabling tribunals to settle the mode of hearing more quickly.

Significant cost savings and convenience: For cases involving parties, witnesses, and experts across multiple jurisdictions, remote participation can materially reduce travel time and expense while facilitating scheduling across time zones.

Institutionalizing technical modalities: With express authorization, the tribunal can regulate technical details through procedural orders, including the hearing platform, electronic presentation of evidence, interpretation arrangements, management of online observers, and contingency protocols for connectivity failures—thereby ensuring orderly, secure, and fair remote proceedings.

Accommodating diversified needs: The ability to “combine” technological means allows the tribunal to design hybrid structures that fit the case—for instance, conducting core factual examination in an on-site hearing while handling document exchange and written questioning through a secure online platform, maximizing procedural efficiency.

4. Technical and operational safeguards — ICDPASO’s proprietary video hearing platform

To operationalize the paragraph’s design for remote and technology-enabled hearings, ICDPASO has deployed a locally hosted proprietary video hearing platform that provides an end-to-end digital hearing solution covering identity verification, online hearing procedures, submission and examination of evidence, transcript generation, and secure archiving.

The platform integrates multiple intelligent features:

Online–offline integration: Dedicated client interfaces are designed for arbitrators, case secretaries, and parties, supporting coordinated use across PC, mobile apps, and WeChat mini-programs. This enables hybrid hearings combining on-site and remote participation and materially improves hearing organization efficiency.

End-to-end digital toolset: Deep integration of blockchain-based multi-stage evidence preservation, coordinated evidence submission and examination across internal and external networks, real-time speech-to-text transcription, facial-recognition verification, multi-party electronic signatures, synchronized transcript review, and encrypted audio-video transmission enhances both intelligence and traceability.

Comprehensive audit trail: From identity authentication and encrypted document upload to recording and archiving, the system generates complete logs across all stages, providing reliable electronic records for procedural supervision, reasoning in awards, and judicial review.

The platform’s regularized operation moves remote hearings from a textual option to a practical norm. It signifies that ICDPASO has established, at both the rules level and the technological level, the parallel status of on-site and remote hearings—constituting an important institutional advantage and infrastructure support relative to more traditional arbitration rules.

Commentary on Paragraph (2): A Dual Calibration for Hearing by Written Submissions

— Party Agreement as the Primary Driver, Coordinated with a Tribunal “Necessity” Review

1. Structure and functional positioning

(1) A “two-track initiation mechanism” for hearing by written submissions

First track: primacy of party agreement. Where the parties clearly agree on hearing by written submissions, the tribunal should respect that agreement. This is a direct application of party autonomy to the selection of procedural form.

Second track: tribunal calibration based on necessity. This includes two layers of discretion:

(i) Even where the parties agreed to documents-only proceedings, the tribunal may still decide to hold a hearing if it considers a hearing necessary for fact-finding—functioning as a due-process “corrective valve.”

(ii) Where there is no agreement on hearing by written submissions, the tribunal may proceed without a hearing only if it both considers a hearing unnecessary and obtains the consent of all parties. This places documents-only proceedings under dual scrutiny—consent and necessity. It prevents the tribunal from unilaterally restricting a party’s right to an oral hearing merely in the name of efficiency, and it also reduces the risk of post-award challenges alleging denial of an opportunity to be heard.

(2) Cost reduction and optimized allocation of resources

For cases with clearly defined issues, adequate documentary evidence, or disputes predominantly involving questions of law, documents-only proceedings can substantially reduce time and cost. The paragraph’s “agreement + necessity” dual filter ensures that documents-only proceedings are reserved for cases genuinely suited to them, avoiding the sacrifice of substantive fairness to an excessive pursuit of efficiency.

2. Comparative perspective

Article 24 of the Model Law provides that, absent party agreement to the contrary, the tribunal decides whether to hold oral hearings; however, if a party requests a hearing, the tribunal should generally hold one unless the parties have agreed that no hearing shall be held.③ Paragraph (2) adopts a comparable balancing architecture through a three-step sequence—“agreement first—necessity exception—unanimous-consent documents-only proceedings”—seeking the same equilibrium: preventing abuse of “hearing rights” as a dilatory tactic while avoiding inappropriate documents-only proceedings that compromise the right to examine evidence and present argument. Both frameworks aim for a refined balance between efficiency and due process.

3. Coordination with domestic law

The New Arbitration Law (Article 51) establishes the basic principle that arbitration should be conducted by hearing, while also providing that, where the parties agree to proceed without a hearing, the tribunal may render an award on the basis of written materials.④ Paragraph (2) both aligns with and develops this framework in two respects:

it places “party agreement on documents-only proceedings” in a clear priority position, enhancing predictability; and

where there is no agreement, it imposes a dual gatekeeping requirement—“the tribunal considers a hearing unnecessary + consent of all parties”—before converting to documents-only proceedings.

This design makes the transition between hearing and documents-only proceedings more transparent and controllable. On the one hand, it uses unanimous consent as a prerequisite to documents-only proceedings in the absence of an agreement, limiting the space for post-award challenges based on alleged denial of a hearing. On the other hand, it preserves a “necessity hearing” corrective valve to prevent the tribunal from curtailing examination and argument rights merely for efficiency. The tribunal may also articulate, in a procedural order, the reasons for selecting the procedural form, thereby strengthening the award’s resilience in set-aside proceedings and enforcement challenges.

Commentary on Paragraph (3): Institutionalizing the Tribunal’s Case-Management Authority — Procedural Orders and a Majority-Vote Decision Mechanism

1. Positioning and core mechanisms

This paragraph sets out two mutually reinforcing procedural institutions:

The procedural order mechanism. “Unless the parties have otherwise agreed, the tribunal may conduct the case in such manner as it considers appropriate … and may issue procedural orders.” This functions as the formal output channel for procedural discretion, converting abstract procedural authority into written, enforceable instructions capable of compliance and supervision.

The procedural decision-making rule. Where the tribunal members disagree on procedural matters, the majority view governs; where no majority can be formed, the presiding arbitrator’s view prevails. This moves the collegiate majority principle upstream from merits determination into the case-management stage, and provides a final fallback to ensure the proceedings do not stall due to internal deadlock.

2. Comparative perspective

The SIAC Rules (2025) recognize procedural orders as instruments through which the tribunal and parties structure issues and procedure. ⑤The ICC Rules (2021) include a dedicated mechanism for a “Terms of Reference,” requiring the tribunal—based on written materials and, where appropriate, in consultation with the parties and their latest submissions—to produce a document that advances the procedure in a manner functionally comparable to procedural orders. ⑥Paragraph (3) expressly confirms, in rule text, the legal status of procedural orders and the decision rule for procedural matters, aligning closely with mainstream international practice.

3. “Majority vote + presiding arbitrator fallback” — addressing the “veto dilemma” in three-member tribunals

If a three-member tribunal required unanimity for procedural decisions, divergent procedural philosophies could easily produce delay. By applying the majority logic to the procedural stage, this paragraph serves key practical purposes:

Ensuring continuity of procedure. Majority voting prevents procedural management from being held hostage by a single dissenting view, allowing case management conferences, procedural orders, and timetable adjustments to move forward efficiently.

Strengthening the presiding arbitrator’s leadership role. Where views are evenly divided and no majority emerges, the presiding arbitrator’s view determines the course. This is not undue concentration of power, but a necessary governance closure to avoid internal stalemate and the externalization of procedural conflict to parties or the institution.

Systemic coherence with merits-stage decision rules. The New Arbitration Law adopts majority decision-making for awards and permits the recording of minority opinions. ⑦Extending that principle into the procedural stage creates coherent decision logic from case management through to merits adjudication.

Commentary on Paragraph (4): Procedural Embedding of Efficiency Management — The Coordinated Mechanism of Timetable Governance and Case Management Conferences

1. Structure and core functions

This paragraph establishes a dual-axis efficiency governance framework built on a procedural timetable and case management conferences:

Procedural timetable: It translates the abstract objective of efficiency into enforceable and monitorable deadline milestones, making the pace of the proceedings transparent and predictable.

Case management conference: It functions as a dynamic calibration mechanism, empowering the tribunal to adjust procedure in response to changed circumstances, evolving dispute focus, or unforeseen obstacles, while the requirement to consult the parties supplies the due-process basis for procedural adjustments.

2. Comparative perspective

The ICC Rules (2021) explicitly treat case management conferences and procedural timetables as core tools of effective case management, and allow such conferences to be held in person, by videoconference, or by telephone. ⑧The HKIAC Rules (2024) and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2021) likewise contemplate the establishment of timetables⑨, while the SIAC Rules (2025) require tribunals to convene case management conferences. ⑩Paragraph (4) incorporates these approaches into the Rules’ main text, elevating timetables from a discretionary option to a standardized procedural instrument and aligning ICDPASO with the prevailing “timetable governance” model.

Commentary on Paragraph (5): Dual Baselines of Procedural Justice and Efficiency — Equal Opportunity to Present One’s Case and the Duty of Diligent Conduct

1. Normative positioning — a dual-baseline design

This paragraph is the “baseline clause” of Article 26, setting non-derogable boundaries for the tribunal’s exercise of procedural discretion from two complementary directions:

Affirmative obligation: The first sentence expresses a core element of procedural fairness rooted in natural justice, requiring the tribunal—across procedural arrangements, admission of evidence, deadlines, and hearing organization—to ensure substantively equal opportunities to be heard and to respond.

Restrictive obligation: The second sentence is the normative articulation of efficiency, imposing a duty of diligence to advance the proceedings and restrain tactical procedural behavior, preserving arbitration’s institutional competitiveness by avoiding procedural laxity and cost inflation.

Together, these obligations operate synergistically: fairness supplies the legitimacy boundary for efficiency; efficiency supplies timeliness and practicality as a component of procedural justice.

2. Jurisprudential explanation — the meaning and limits of “reasonable opportunity”

The requirement of an “equal opportunity to present one’s case and to respond” aligns closely with the internationally recognized “reasonable opportunity” principle. The ICC Rules (2021), the LCIA Rules (2020), and the Model Law all require tribunals to treat parties fairly and provide a reasonable opportunity to present their case.⑪ However, “reasonable” does not mean “unlimited,” nor does it equate to a procedural pace unilaterally preferred by a party.

A representative formulation appears in the Singapore Court of Appeal’s reasoning in China Machine New Energy Corp v Jaguar Energy Guatemala LLC.⑫ In assessing alleged breaches of natural justice, the court focused not on whether a party was dissatisfied with procedural arrangements, but on whether the party was in fact deprived of a genuine opportunity to address key issues, submit evidence, or advance legal argument. Put differently, where the tribunal sets clear deadlines and scope in a procedural order, the party has notice and the capacity to comply, and the party fails to act, that failure does not amount to procedural unfairness. This jurisprudence is particularly significant for remote hearings, documents-only proceedings, and strict deadline management: so long as rules are clear, deadlines are reasonable, and objections are fairly addressed, the tribunal’s procedural decisions will generally withstand judicial scrutiny.

Chinese judicial practice reflects similar logic. In set-aside or non-enforcement proceedings, courts apply a cautious approach to claims of “no opportunity to be heard.” Findings that lead to annulment consequences typically involve fundamental procedural dysfunction—such as failure to serve hearing notices resulting in complete lack of knowledge, or failure to grant any time to respond. By contrast, where the tribunal has made clear arrangements in procedural orders and a party fails to participate or submit on time due to its own reasons, procedural defect arguments are unlikely to succeed.

3. Practical value of the dual baselines

(1) Providing a legitimacy framework for the tribunal’s procedural decisions

This paragraph supplies both behavioral guidance and reasoning resources. Where a party seeks extensions, additional evidence rounds, or further hearings, the tribunal may rely on the fact that equal opportunity has been ensured and that unnecessary delay must be avoided, yielding a transparent and predictable balancing standard.

(2) Deterring tactical behavior and strengthening procedural resilience

Parties may invoke “insufficient opportunity to be heard” to challenge unfavorable procedural decisions or awards. By placing “equality” and “efficiency” as co-equal duties, the paragraph prevents the tribunal’s discretion from being simplistically characterized as “efficiency at the expense of fairness,” thus enhancing an award’s resistance to challenge.

(3) Promoting a substantive conception of procedural fairness

Juxtaposing “equal opportunity” with “avoid unnecessary delay” helps correct formalistic views that equate fairness with unlimited hearing or absolute symmetry. Procedural fairness should be substantive, proportionate to dispute complexity, and capable of incorporating efficiency as a legitimate consideration. This paragraph is the rule-based expression of that higher-order equilibrium.

III. Systemic Coordination with the Revised PRC Arbitration Law

1. Statutory recognition of online arbitration provides higher-level legal support for remote hearings

The New Arbitration Law (Article 11) formally incorporates widely used online arbitration into the statutory framework, addressing long-standing disputes regarding the legality of online hearing procedures and the validity of online arbitration agreements.⑬ Article 26 explicitly identifies remote hearings as a legally recognized modality parallel to on-site hearings and authorizes the tribunal to use videoconferencing, teleconferencing, and other communications means—alone or in combination—thereby aligning precisely with the legislative approach. By institutionalizing remote procedure at the rules level, it reduces the room for challenges based on alleged “formal illegality,” enhances predictability, and strengthens the arbitration’s capacity to withstand procedural disputes.

2.Front-loaded procedural governance through rule-based tools enables explainable efficiency

While the New Arbitration Law strengthens procedural fairness, it leaves many concrete case-management tools to institutional rules. Article 26’s core advantage lies in writing the prevailing international “case-management methodology” directly into the Rules—case management conferences, procedural orders, procedural timetables, majority-vote decision-making, and the presiding arbitrator fallback—forming a governance framework spanning the full lifecycle of the proceedings. This configuration enables tribunals, even in highly adversarial cases, to proceed on clear authorization, narrow inefficient issues, and control cost spillover.

IV. Conclusion: Reconstructing Arbitral Procedure Through Governance Rationality — The Value and Implications of Article 26

Article 26 is not an isolated technical provision. It is a modern procedural framework centered on governance rationality. Its five-paragraph structure integrates the hearing-first principle, remote hearings as a parallel mode, and documents-only proceedings as a consent-based pathway with a suite of procedural tools—procedural orders, timetables, case management conferences, majority-vote mechanisms, and dual baseline obligations. This integration shifts arbitration procedure from one-directional instruction to a governance system that is tribunal-led yet consultative, adjustable, and subject to oversight. The design both reflects the international evolution toward efficiency and digitalization and aligns institutionally with the legislative spirit of the The New Arbitration Law. It offers parties engaged in cross-border dispute resolution an exemplary model that combines procedural safeguards with user-friendly operability.

More fundamentally, the value of Article 26 lies not only in setting the framework for hearing modalities, but also in systematically introducing and integrating a set of interlocking procedural instruments—procedural orders, documents-only proceedings, procedural timetables, and case management conferences—into a highly operable procedural governance mechanism. These tools are interconnected and mutually reinforcing, ensuring that the tribunal can effectively steer the proceedings while respecting procedural rights, thereby achieving an organic unity between arbitration’s efficiency advantages and the requirements of procedural justice.